Update in process July, 2010.

Battle of the River Plate: Panzerschiffe - Design Disaster! Diesel Engines Major Problem.

The Battle of the River Plate, 13th December 1939, is firmly fastened in the annals of naval history. Seventy years ago heavy gunfire echoed in the South Atlantic, two hundred and fifty miles off Uruguay, British and German sailors battled valiantly. More than one hundred young men suffered death. However, despite the passage of time and multitudes of media publications a few essential facts remain obscure. In February, 2010, the German legation in Montevideo gifted a limited edition of Captain Langsdorff`s log book covering the raider cruise to the Maritime Museum in Pocitos. This edition is a Spanish verbatim translation of the original German log book. To read this log is to fully comprehend the military and humanitarian qualities of Langsdorff. It clearly identifies a major problem with the diesel engines. They vibrated so severely that the main engines had out of round pistons and top speed was reduced to 23kns. Smoke emissions could not be avoided. The ship needed immediate dock repairs in November. (update continues)

In the first naval battle of WW ll a German pocket battleship, Admiral Graf Spee, engaged three British cruisers. The heavy cruiser, HMS Exeter, took devastating damage and retreated to the Falklands. Graf Spee ran into Montevideo with two light cruisers, HMS Ajax and HMS Achilles, trailing at a safe distance. Montevideo’s harbour hosted the German warship for three days until the Uruguayan government insisted she leave their neutral waters. Ajax, Achilles and HMS Cumberland waited to bring her to action in the shallow waters of the Plate estuary. Graf Spee sailed out 17th December and blew up in a spectacular “suicide” just outside the three-mile neutral limit. Graf Spee’s complement escaped to Buenos Aires in small Argentinean vessels. Captain Langsdorff took his own life with a pistol shot 20th December in Buenos Aires

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History correctly credits Commodore Henry Harwood with a brave and well-deserved victory. He commanded the British cruiser squadron with tenacity and his ships and men responded fearlessly. The Admiralty immediately promoted Harwood to Rear-Admiral and the Crown awarded him battlefield honours with K.C.B. (knight commander of the bath). The Crown also awarded battlefield honours, C.B. (companion of the bath) to the three cruisers' captains. The record credits Captain Hans Langsdorff, commanding Graf Spee, as a principled, compassionate naval office. However, continued misunderstanding clouds the real story. Did he also earn and deserve 'military' honours? A few important background details remain buried

Graf Spee was the third warship built in the pocket battleship format. Spee and her two sister ships had diesel engines, six x 11-inch guns and welded construction. They weighed about 12,000 tons with a design speed of 26knts. The designers used every skill to work within weight restrictions laid down in the Versailles treaty. German propaganda claimed the pocket battle ships could outrun a slower enemy battleship and out-gun a faster heavy cruiser. Captain Hans Langsdorff proudly took command of his ship in 1938. Surprisingly, the warship failed his expectations in the 1939 Battle of the River Plate.

The Graf Spee story really began before WW ll. In the mid-thirties, Henry ( Bobby) Harwood had studied the problems of stopping a pocket battleship. He estimated that two heavy cruisers with 8-inch cannons could engage successfully if they tenaciously attacked from two different sides. This idea brought contradictory debate from his peers. Harwood would eventually apply his theoretical tactics using one heavy cruiser and substituting two light cruisers for the second heavy cruiser.

Declaration of war September 3 1939, put Germany against France and Britain. Admiral Graf Spee had sailed for the South Atlantic 21st August under Captain Langsdorff. His mission was to raid enemy merchant ships and avoid enemy warships. Langsdorff felt fully confident in his vessel. However, as hours of constant operation mounted, the diesel engines began to show problems. Heavy vibrations were putting excessive strain on the support structure of the auxiliary engines. This in turn affected the function of the main engines

After three months of raiding, on 26th November Langsdorff recorded in his log the urgent need of a dock overhaul. He listed many major engine problems. Top speed had dropped to 23kns and they could not avoid emitting smoke. Spee had already sunk six enemy merchant ships but the mission needed to end. Langsdorff decided to continue raiding on his way home. However, should a good opportunity arise to add to his score he would tackle an escorting cruiser. He wrote that his ship could expect victory over a warship lower in class than the battle cruiser HMS Renown. But, Langsdorff’s standing orders said to avoid enemy warships - even if inferior

Meanwhile Commodore Harwood commanded the British South American Cruiser Division - two heavy cruisers and two light cruisers. HMS Cumberland, HMS Exeter, HMSAjax and HMSAchilles patrolled the west coast of South America. Henry ‘Bobby’ Harwood, if given the chance, hoped to engage a pocket battleship with his two heavy cruisers. But general instructions to hunting groups said: Protect merchant ship concentration points - do not waste time looking for the enemy unless his position is known.

.Captain Langsdorff captured and sank two more merchants at the beginning of December. Both these ships sent out distress signals that alerted the British Admiralty. Harwood received the signals and carefully calculated a possible arrival date of the enemy in his area of responsibility. Every instinct and professional judgement told him to protect the River Plate traffic. HMS Cumberland was servicing in the Falklands but Harwood decided to concentrate Exeter, Achilles and Ajax (all his available ships) in the approaches to the plate. The Commodore intended tactically to use the two light cruisers in place of one heavy cruiser. This decision to concentrate, stretched Harwood’s command authority to the limit.

Graf Spee met her supply ship Altmark in mid-Atlantic on 6th December. After taking fuel and supplies they practiced a search light drill. In the darkened distance a ship passed incognito - sailing without lights. For security reasons, Langsdorff did not challenge the ship but decided to move on as quickly as possible. Next day, 7th December, on course toward Santos Bay, Brasil, Spee captured Streonshalh. This increased the raider's prizes to nine merchant ships totaling 50,000 tons. The German prize crew found a bag of papers floating in the water. These papers provided exact information (co-ordinates)showing Streonshalh`s routing from Montevideo. On the same day Langsdorff received a radio signal from Berlin that showed full details of four merchant ships that had sailed 5th December. The German captain considered intercepting this small convoy, but he may run into an enemy warship protecting the merchants. Still, he had faith in his ship and men. Taking a calculated risk to add to his prizes seemed worthwhile - and perhaps test his ship in battle. Langsdorff altered his previous course and headed south west, zig-zagging along >Streonshalh`s outbound route.

On 10th December HMS Achilles left Montevideo and steamed out to meet the other two cruisers assembling off the coast. Meanwhile, merchant ships were accumulating in the harbour on the advice of the British Consular Shipping Advisory Committee (a small British naval intelligence section stationed in Montevideo). Whispered rumours passed amongst the people. Action at sea seemed immanent. Ominously, Spee encountered another hindrance. Since the mission began, the Arado spotter plane had experienced ongoing problems when landing. Cold sea water splashed across the hot air-cooled engine. All spare parts were now used. The plane quit 11th December.

At dawn 13th December Harwood’s cruisers and Langsdorff’s pocket battleship came to blows. Using powerful optics on the telemeter atop the tower, watchers on Spee saw several mast tips. Simultaneously, sharp eyes on Ajax spotted light smoke. This soon changed into black smoke as the pocket battle ship switched to full power - bearing toward the squadron

Valuable minutes had passed while Spee identified the British warships. Three cruisers in company surprised Langsdorff. He assessed his ship too slow to avoid engagement. Therefore, given the choice of action, he must eliminate his largest opponent - as quickly as possible. The German captain focussed his main guns on Exeter.

Commodore Harwood had exercised his ships for the exact scenario that now faced them. Exeter headed directly for Spee while Ajax and Achilles swung around to attack her opposite side. Graf Spee opened fire at 6.17am and straddled Exeter. The heavy cruiser replied within minutes while the two light cruisers closed to obtain gun range

Within fifteen minutes eight inch shells poured from Exeter in a furious flurry. Three of them struck home. One hit an anti-aircraft gun on the starboard side of Spee, passed through two decks then exploded and wrecked a vital boiler room. This installation supplied steam to move and clean the ship’s diesel fuel. They could not repair the damage at sea. Graf Spee could not replace prepared fuel now held in day tanks. She had only an estimated 16hrs of fuel on hand and must go ashore for repairs.

Unaware that she had scored a winning shot, Exeter paid a horrendous price for her courageous action. Spee’s 11-inch strikes reduced her to a flaming wreck. After 80 minutes of murderous battle she was at the mercy of the German captain. But Langsdorff pulled his heavy guns off Exeter and directed them toward the two light cruisers now racing toward Spee

Meanwhile, Ajax and Achilles had soon found the range and rained their 6-inch shells onto the German ship. Although the effects were indiscernible, they riddled the enemy with fast accurate strikes. When ammunition seemed low Harwood decided to pull back to regroup. To his surprise the pocket battleship also pulled away and headed toward Montevideo.

On board Graf Spee, Captain Langsdorff had received minor injuries in the early minutes of the battle. Blast from an exploding shell knocked him down, unconscious. In quick time he recovered and resumed control of the ship’s tactics. Later, when a lull permitted, Langsdorff inspected his ship. The devastating effects of 8-inch and 6-inch hits spoke alarmingly of Spee’s overrated armour. Thirty - six young men lay dead. Many more bled from serious wounds as the doctors and medics worked swiftly to ease their pains. Chief engineer Klepp gave Langsdorff the drastic news of a deadly fuel shortage. The fuel separating system was dysfunctional. They had about 16hrs of useable fuel and no possibility of repairing at sea.

Langsdorff hurried to the bridge to order the ship into the nearest neutral port. Sixteen hours of fuel would burn off very quickly. Langsdorff ‘s orders to head for Montevideo dismayed the senior officers, Ascher and Wattenberg. But they had faith in the captain and viewed his grim demeanor stoically. Langsdorff did not explain the fuel problem. He kept the sensitive information on a “need to know”category. Also, he must report the problem to Berlin without alerting the enemy and the “enemy within”. Goering, Goebbels and Himmler would make hay with such naval difficulties.

Hans Langsdorff had earned his stripes in the Imperial Navy. He received an iron cross for service in the battle of Jutland and later commanded minesweepers. After the inglorious scuttling of the fleet in Scapa Flow he worked closely with the high command. Finally he served as naval liaison officer in General Schleicher’s brief chancellory before Hitler Langsdorff had privy to the High Command’s intent to rebuild a superior battle fleet. Admiral Raeder had advanced this intent brilliantly since becoming Chief of the Navy in 1928. Hitler approved a massive battle fleet in 1937 under the Z-PLan. This could make Germany a major sea power when completed in 1946. But the declaration of war in 1939 had slowed the process. With his "broad picture" view of Raeder’s plans Langsdorff instantly recognized the fallout inferred in the Graf Spee experience. Unreliable engines, overrated armour, and a vulnerable fuel flow system were not maintenance problems but serious design flaws. Moreover, they applied to Spee’s two sister ships. Such a major disappointment must remain top secret. Graf Spee could not fall into enemy hands

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In his initial radio report to Berlin the captain implanted vital information into the message. He expected unfriendly ears would intercept the signal. Langsdorff mentioned the loss of a facility to provide fresh water, kitchen and laundry services. But he said nothing about the fuel flow, although this relied on the same facility. The captain reported his dead and wounded casualties. And, that some cruiser shells had pierced the main armour. Most important, he said he was going into Montevideo “despite the possibility of entrapment.” Berlin replied “understood” - many hours before the ship entered the River Plate estuary. The operations department had plenty of time to redirect and order Langsdorff an alternative. They concluded from the captain’s signal that there was none

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Spee crossed the imaginary line between Cabo Santa Maria (Uruguay) and Cabo San Antonio (Argentina) about 6pm local time. She continued in the estuary and entered Montevideo harbour about 11pm.without pilot assistance. Lt.-Cmdr Robert Höpfner had navigated the entrance channel often before the war while sailing with the Holland America line. Ajax and Achilles trailed in Spee’s wake and stood on guard

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Around the globe the sea battle news exploded in front pages. Telegraphs hummed and phone lines chattered as the drama unfolded. Anxious families in Germany, Britain and New Zealand awaited the outcome. Politicians took the stage and fabricated their stories. Three days of turbulent exchanges climaxed in a declaration from Uruguay that Spee must leave its neutral waters by 7pm 17th December.

Newly promoted Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Harwood,K.C.B. prepared his tactics. Fortunately, HMS Cumberland had arrived from the Falklands late on 14th to join Ajax and Achilles in the estuary. Harwood resolved that the German would not get past his cruisers and escape to the homeland. He expected a bloody and brutal final battle.

Langsdorff had received orders to delay any action as long as possible. The Uruguayan deadline forced his hand. Most important in his naval agenda rested the responsibility to keep the ship out of enemy hands and close inspection. Emergency repairs were completed including the essential steam system. Still, the engines had suffered additional stress in using top speed to reach the estuary. Shallows and uncertain sand bars restricted speed ingoing or outgoing. Could Spee break out - even to deep water where they could scuttle and prevent enemy inspection? Five hours of sailing in the estuary’s shallows while facing three enemy cruisers made success unlikely. Spee had proved vulnerable to 8-inch shells.

German eyes had clearly seen and noted the cruisers Cumberland, Ajax and Achilles awaiting their chance to engage in the estuary. A clever British ruse had given the lie that HMS Ark Royal and HMS Renown were nearby. Langsdorff reported the presence of the heavy ships to Berlin. This strengthened his personal choice - immediate scuttling. The captain realistically recognized the present overwhelming force of the three cruisers. They would definitely prevent Spee from escaping the shallows of the estuary and reaching deep water. Cumberland’s eight x 8-inch guns allied with the light cruisers under the skilful leadership of Harwood left no hope of success. Only a useless blood bath beckoned.

Now Langsdorff must get Admiral Raeder’s permission to scuttle Graf Spee. Raeder in turn must get the authority from Hitler - the leader of all the armed forces. The situation report from Langsdorff to Raeder requested an answer directly to the ship. All parties knew that internment of the ship in Uruguay was not acceptable. He suggested, with irony, a breakout to Buenos Aires. Scuttling remained the most practical option. Raeder led Hitler to believe that Langsdorff would try to fight the ship to Buenos Aires and Hitler signed the orders. Nevertheless, the orders boldly stated “if scuttling, ensure effective destruction.”

Langsdorff’s path was clear. He would eliminate any useful material evidence on Spee and go down with his ship. He wrote a letter to his wife 17th December in Montevideo that stressed his wish to keep the ship out of enemy hands and avoid useless bloodshed. Senior officers persuaded him to join the escape to Buenos Aires and complete his responsibility to the crew. In the afternoon, news from Buenos Aires advised that Ark Royal and Renown were fuelling in Rio de Janeiro.

At 6.30pm 17th December the drama resumed. Admiral Graf Spee sailed out of Montevideo harbour and blew up outside the neutral zone. Tacoma, a German freighter sailed in Spee’s wake carrying the bulk of Spee’s crew. The men transferred to three small Argentine boats and made way to Buenos Aires. Langsdorff with a few senior officers and the skeleton crew that handled the physical scuttling followed in the ship’s launch. All were processed and prepared for internment in Argentina.

During the night of 20th December Captain Langsdorff wrote a letter to Baron von Thermann (the German Ambassador in Buenos Aires) taking full responsibility. He stressed the priority of keeping the ship out of enemy hands and avoiding useless blood shed. Sometime after midnight Langsdorff put a pistol shot into his head.

Epilogue: The British navy wished to inspect the wrecked ship. They arranged a salvage sale in 1940 and a group of specialists headed by Ken Purvis arrived in Montevideo. Purvis wrote a severe criticism of the pocket battleship design but could not report on the sunken engines nor the fuel flow. This critical mechanical information remained secret for many years.

An excellent BBC documentary, “TimeWatch” in 2006 gave entertainment value but fell short in historical facts. The commentators’ insistence on the “heavy ship ruse” and lack of reference to HMS Cumberland’s presence in the estuary left historical gaps. Anyway, without explaining Graf Spee’s design flaws the real story will always remain untold.

I believe that HMS Exeter deserves full credit for disabling Admiral Graf Spee in the battle of the River Plate.

The Admiralty rewarded Admiral Sir Henry Harwood’s bold judgment, to brazenly attack a pocket battleship. But history overlooks the fact that his cruisers and proven expertise prompted Langsdorff to scuttle Spee.

Captain Langsdorff, is recognized as a naval officer and a gentleman. He also deserves military plaudits when we know all the facts.

History is the cornerstone of the future. It must reflect the truth as it becomes available. Perhaps the final chapter of the Graf Spee saga will find full light, some day.

Joseph Gilbey
Hillsburgh, Ontario.
July, 2010.

Readers: This ever emerging story carries some controversial points. I invite you to contact me (jogilbey@grafspee.com) if you have any questions or comments.

Thank you,

Joseph Gilbey
Hillsburgh, Ontario.
July, 2010.